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2. Beyond the divide: the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Political Rights and the World Trade 
Organization 
Robert Howse and Ruti G. Teitel 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
Since the end of the Cold War. two main visions have guided the evolution or 
international law and institutions -- the vision or human rights and hu111a11ity 
and that or economic globalisation. Both visions have offcnxl challenges to 
traditional understandings or sovereignty: both have given a m:w significanu.· 
to non-state actors in the evolution and implementation or intl'.rnation:d lmv. 
Both havl'. often givl'.n rise to demands and aspirations tu global politics and/or 
constitutionalism as well as new relationships between local_ national. 
rl'.gional and global levels of governance. 
However thl'. legal, institutional and policy cultures or international hu111an 
rights law and of intnnational trade. financial and invl'.slrnent law have devel-
oped largely in isolation from one another. 
As a rnatlcr or international law. both the lntcnwtional Co1·c1u1111 on 
l:'co110111ic, Social and Hw11m11ic Riglll.1 I "ICLSCR. )2 and the World Tr,1de 
Organi:,.ation ( "WTO') arc, in the first instance. treaty regimes_ A fundamental 
structural characteristic of the international legal systelll is that or dcccntral-
i:,ation without hierarchy.-' Treaty norms in the ICESCR have an equal legal 
This chapter i,- derived from a previous paper written by the aulhors: sec R 
Howse and R G Teitel, "Beyond the Divide: The Covenant 011 Lcono111ic. Social and 
CullUral Rights and the World Trade Organi1.atio11 (Occasional Paper No 3(L Freidrid1 
Eberl Stiltung. 2007) l1ttp://libra1-y_i'es_dc/pdi'-i'iles/ie1./glohal/04'i72.pdi' at 11 
November 2008. 
2 Opened for signature 16 December I 966, 999 UNTS 3 (cntcred into force 3 
January 1976)_ 
1 Sec generally, ln1ernational Law Commission, FmJ!,1111'11/11tio11 of' i11tema-
tio11a/ lull': l)ijfirnftie.1· urisi11g .fimn the dil'cni/irntirm 11nd 1'\fhllL\imr o( i111emu1in11ul 
/ell\', Report of the Study Group of the International Lnv Commission, finali.scd by 
Martti Koskenniemi. UN Doc. A/CN-4/L/682 ( 13 Arri!. 2006). 
39 
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status to those in the WTO. A majority of states arc parties to both the WTO 
Single Undertaking (thz: core WTO treaties) and the ICESCR. The principle of 
decentralization without hierarchy, along with that of giving full effect to 
international obligations, implies the need to interpret and to develop these 
regimes in a complementary and consistent fashion to the extent possible. As 
the n:port of the International Law Commission ("ILC') on fragmentation of 
international law notes: 'In international law, there is a strong presumption 
against normative con llict' .'1 
Since the WTO Seattle Ministerial, now almost a decade ago, there has 
been ;1 concerted effort in the international human rights community, by 
activists, academics, and the Office of the High Commissioner to overcome 
this isolationism, attempting to understand how trade affects the realisation or 
human rights and what implications human rights obligations have for the 
interpretation and negotiation of trade agrcerncnts_·'i It is fair to say that these 
efforts have not been matched by a comparable openness on the part of the 
international trade law and policy community: the WTO negotiations in the 
Doha Round arc occurring without any explicit reference to human rights. 
Thl'. Cold War legacy of economic and social rights brought with it an asso-
ciation with discredited collectivist approaches to economic and social organ-
isation. The concept was often viewed as polari1,ing along East/West, 
North/South l"ault lines; this is a heritage that must be overcome if economic 
and social rights arc to gain purchase in the international economic regimes. 
The conventional economic policy ideology prevalent in the international 
trade law and policy knowledge communities views the issues surrounding 
access to essential services, food, housing, and healthcare as a matter of trade-
offs under scarcity. From that perspective, there may be a tension between the 
role of the market in generating the wealth necessary to obtain these goods and 
the capacity lo guarantee wider access to them through redistribution; thus, 
speaking of rights in these contexts is often viewed as incoherent, mere postur-
ing ur wishl"ul thinking. The problem here is a lack of awareness in the inter-
national trade policy community about how econolllic and social rights have 
been interpreted and elaborated in the policy and practice ofthc international 
human rights institutions. 
Ibid [371. 
Sec for example, UN High Commissioner !"or Human Rights ("UNI-ICHR"), 
/,ihcm/i;;utimr of tmde in serriccs and h1111w11 rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 
(2'i June 2002): UNHCHR, (;/ol){//i~ation u11cl its inrpact 011 the fi,1/ enjoyment if 
l1111111111 rig/11.1, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/54 (22 J\pril 2003): UNIIC'HR, H1111wn rights, 
trudc 1md i111'csl111m1, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (2 July 2003); UNHCHR, hl1/Jt1cr 
of the TR/I'S 11gre('llrc111 011 !he f:'njrn 111ml of oil Hu11u111 Righ1,1·, UN Doc 
E/CN.--1-/Suh.2/200I/I3 (28 .lune 2001 ). 
At the sarne time, the collapse of the Washington Consen.sus, the mixed 
track record or 'liheral' economic reform in contrihuting to imprnvclllcnt in 
living stnndards in devdoping countries, and the new economics of globalisa-
tion rcllcct a fumlame11tal crisis or conlidence in the capacity of ccrn1<1mics 
oriented towards libernlisation or global markets to provide a universal 
'formula' l'or the attainment of human wcll-being. 6 There is an absence today 
of a plausible, agreed normative cconolllic framework that can infor111 debates 
about globalisation as well as related domestic reforms. This provides a 
window or opportunity for international human rights law to supply an alter-
native normative structure for such a debate. T<J realise this possibility. rights 
must be capable of being linked to specific policy options and choices ,md 
must be capable of translation into a framework for an,tlysing the effects of 
alternative trade and related domestic policies. including alternative possible 
new rules i11 trade agreements. The pro111ising work of Armartya Sen 011 devel-
opment as freedom may be highly relevant in lhis regard. 7 
The /)cc/urution 011 Tmdc Re/med /11tcl!cc11wl Pm11crl_\· Rights und the 
Pu/Jlic flealrh 8 and the Ki111/wrle_,, (Conflict /)ia11w11(/s) Waii·cr<J reflect an 
unacknowledged debt lo human rights consciousness in the WTO. The currrnt 
Director-General ol" the WTO, Pascal Lamy. has written about glohalis,ttion 
with a human face and his conception or the economic sphere. including the 
international economic sphere. is deeply rooted in the notion of hurnanity. lO 
More recently. a joint study hy the ILO and the WTO SL'.crctariat explicitly 
refers to freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as 
·universally recogni1.cd human rights', urges their respect as such (and not just 
for instrumental reasons of social peace). and refutes with empirical cvidcm:l'. 
the notion that respect for such rights harms compclitivencss. 11 
6 Sec, for example. [) Rudrik. The G!o!Jil! c;o1·e1m111n· of" frllifl': us i( 
/)c1·c!opmc111 l?co!!r Mol!ercd (United Nations Development Progran11l1L'. (iL·ncva. 
2001 ). 
7 Sec, for cxampk, Amartya Sen. l>nclo;m1rnr (I.I i'lecd/J/11 (;\nchor Booh.s. 
New York. 2000). 
x WTO Due WT/MIN(()I )/DEC/2 (20 November 2001) http://www.wto.mg/ 
english/thcwto_c/minist ___ e/min0l_c/rnindecl_trip.s_e.ht111 at 11 November 2008. 
'J WTO Doc WT/LHl7(1 ( 19 December 2006) http://www.kimhcrkyproccss. 
com/download/gctfile/3:ilJ at I l November 2008. 
JO See, most notably. Pascal Lamy. "Humanizing Globalisation' (Speech deliv-
ered in Santiago de Chile, 30 January 2006) http://www.wto.org/english/ 
ncws_c/sppl_c/sppl I 6_e.ht111 at 11 November 2008. 
11 International Labor Office and the Secrdariat of the World Trade 
Organization. Jl'adc ond D11p!ornrc111: Clw!lrngc.1fi1r 1-'o!ic_r Rcsmrclr ((LO and WTO. 
Geneva. 2007) 66, http://www.ilu.org/wc111sp:i/gn)llps/public/---dgrq)l)rt-,/---dnlmrn/ 
---wehdev/documcnts/publication/wcms_0817..J.2.pdf at 8 August 20011. 
42 /'/Jc WTO mu! 11111111111 rig/Ifs 
Reconstructing globalisation on the basis or a human rights consciousness, 
and in particular with a view to fully realising the vision of the ICESCR, is a 
dau11ti11g task which would need to engage many policy disciplines and many 
institutions. Apparent lack of consensus concerning the legal status and precise 
meaning or some social and economic rights is an obstacle to their inllucnce 
in the international trade regime. 
In our view. a short- to medium-tenn strategy is needed to identify some 
fairly erecisc and SJJecijic interconnections between the legal concepts and 
doctrines in the treaty texh of both regimes. As international lawyers whose 
collective expertise extends across both regimes, we seek in this chapter to 
conceive the challenge as a legal question of the interaction and interpretation 
or treaty norms. 12 But how does one achieve that deeper level of cooperation 
and cross-cornmunication, given the different languages or idioms in which 
the human rights community and the trade policy community understand the 
challenges or globalisation'> 
When we examine the features or the WTO treaties as legal instruments -
as opposed to the way that the trade policy community has often viewed the 
WTO regime - it quickly becomes evident that the treaties themselves have 
been structured in many ways so as to ensure that the means adopted in the 
WTO to achieve economic goals arc not inconsistent with the human purposes 
and values intrinsic to the norms in the ICESCR. 
The preamble to the WTO Agreement states the purposes of the WTO 
system in terms that arc broadly consistent with the human ends that underlie 
the rights in the ICESCR: 
... raising standards of living. ensuring lull employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the produc-
tion of and trmlc in goods and services. while allowing f"or the optimal use of the 
world's resource'> in accordance with the objective of" sustc1inahle development. 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for 
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at differ-
ent levels of ecomm1ic development. Rcn1g11i:i11g further that there is need for posi-
tive efforts de.signed lo en.sure that developing countric,'-.. and i::speci,dly the lea.st 
developed alllong them. secure a share in the growth in international trade commen-
surate with the needs of their economic development. 
The values that permeate the WTO preamble gel with the obligation provi-
sion in Article ::?.(I) ICESCR, which reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
throufh international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and lcchni-
Sec generally International Law Commission. above n 3. 
linonrl t!tc c!il'irlc 4J 
caL to the maximum or its ,l\'ailahk resources, with ,1 view to achieving progres-
sively the rull n:nlization of thl'. righh recug11i1.ed i11 the present Covenant hy all 
,q,propriatc 111ca1b. including pi1rticularly the adoption ol lcgislativc lllL'asurL·s. 
It is dil'ficult to imagine how the progressive fullil111e111 of econo111ic and social 
rights could be achieved, particularly i11 developing coun1ries, without the 
advancement of the goals stated in the WTO Preamble. Furthennon~. it should 
he noted that Article 2 ICESCR clearly indicates that the responsibility <'f 
states is engaged not just individually with respect to the rights of persons 011 
1heir territory hut also with respect to international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical. 
In most cases, the WTO trea1ies contain exceptions or li111itations claus:cs 
that allow deviation from trade lihcr,llisa1ion rules where the realisation or 
fundamental human values, such as health, is al stake. This approach has not 
been fully honoured or achieved in all respects in existing WTO Llw, espe-
cially in the case of intellectual property rights. Even in these c;1ses, much of 
the problem, however, is arguably a question of the interpret,1tion of the exist-
ing treaty rules in the WTO. In some other instances. on which we shall elab-
orate. commitments within these rules to address econolllic and :-.ocial 
rights-related concerns have not been properly illlplclllented. 
The exercise of interpretation and implementation provides an interna-
tional law~hased means or advancing the consistency of the WTO treaty 
regime with the ICESCR. that is a means that docs not depend 011 the broader 
tran,o.;forlllation or international economic policy or a political rebalancing or 
globalisation. 
With respect to interpretation, the Appellate Body or the WTO has 
suggested that non-WTO legal norms have severnl uses in WTO dispute 
settlement, such as, for example, the interpretation of exceptions to WTO 
obligations (for example, the interpretation of 'exhau-;tible 11,1tural 
resources' in Article XX CiATT 11 in the Shri111p/for1le 14 case): the articula~ 
tion of legal benchmarks related to the situation in developing countries 
(for example. the interpretation of the meaning of 'development needs' in 
the f-,;c - TttrifJ:1,I) case): the establishment or an international recognition ol 
1
-' Mormkesh Agrcc111c111 l:'s1ah!ishi11g the World liwll' Orgu11i:111io11, opened lor 
signature l:i J\pril 19LJ4, 1867 UNTS J (entered into l'orcc I January !LJLJ_'i). annex IJ\ 
( Gencro/ Agrce111rnl 011 forij{I mu/ fr{/{/c) l 8(17 UNTS J l)() ('CATT). 
I.\ United Stales -- /111porl Pmhihitirm of' Ctrtain Shri111p and Shrimp Pmd11cts, 
WTO Doc WT/DS:i8/AB/R ( 12 October 1998) (Report of the Appellate BodyJ 
( 'Shri111;,1fort/c' ). 
l:i 1c·11mf'eC111 Co1111111111ilics - Co11diti1111s/1!r tire Gmnting of'Turiff'Prcji,re11ccs to 
ne1·clo1,i11g Co1111rries. WTO Due WT/DS246//\B/R (20 April 2004) (Report llf the 
Appellate Body)('/£- forijjl''), 
44 The WTO and ln1111u11 rights 
a relevant state ot· affairs (for example, that certain species were endangered 
in the Shri1111,!Turtle case); and the indication or an appropriate standard or 
deference or sensitivity to domestic regulatory action (for example. the 
precautionary principle hy the Appellate Body in the /:'C - Hormones 
case). 1 (, 
Article 31 D)(c) or the Vienna Com·c11tio11 011 the Lcnv o(Ji-catics ( 'VCLT') 
provides that among the mandatory sources of treaty interpretation is 'any 
relevant rules of international law applicable to the parties'. 17 A recent WTO 
panel, in the 1--.;c - GMOs case, declined to consider an international conven-
tion, the Bh,.mfc'f_)' Protocol, 18 in its interpretation of relevant WTO treaty 
provisions because it read this provision as requiring that all the parties of the 
WTO be ,llso parties to the Protocol, for it to be considered as an interpreta-
tive aid. I') This narrow approach to Article 31 (3)(c) has been rejected both by 
the Study Group on Fragmentation of the International Law Commission20 
and hy the International Court of Justice in the recent Oil Plotf,mn.121 decision. 
In any case, the Appellate Body of the WTO has used international law as 
reflective of hroad agreement in the international community even where not 
all or the parties to dispute were bound by the instrument in question (the Rio 
Co111·cntion 22 in Shri11111ffor1/e). 
One limit on the use or non-WTO law reflected in the recent Mexico - S(4i 
Drinks21 case is that the Appellate Body will not on its own make a determi-
nation as to whether a particular WTO Member has violated its obligations 
under a non-WTO legal in.strument. This does not significantly narrow the role 
for non-WTO law in interpretation. Regarding economic social and cultural 
rights, the issue will not normally be whether a WTO Member has violated a 
ir, E11ro11e1111 Cm1111H111ities - Mca.rnre.1 Conccming !vlcot a/Ill Mem Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS2(1/i\B/R, AH-1997-4 (13 February 1998) (Report of the Appellate 
Body) ( · /,'( · - f-/omwncs') 46ff. 
17 Opened for signature 23 May I %9, 1155 UNTS :n I (entered into force 27 
January 1980 J. 
18 ( ·urtugcnu l'mtocol on /Jiornfi'l_1· to the Cmn·c11tio11 on Biodi1·1,,-,1·itv, opened 
for signature 29 January 2000. 39 ILM 1027 (entered into force 11 September 2003). 
19 F11ropca11 Co1111111111ities - Meusure.1 J\lfc'cling !he J\p11ro1·u/ wul Marketing of 
!Jiotcch Fmduc1.1. WTO Docs WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (29 
September 2006) 17.'i8ffl (Panel Report) ('/:C - GMOs'). 
20 International Law Commission. above n 3. 14481, 14501. 14711. 
21 Oil !'[atfrmll.\' (l.l/a111ic Rcpuhlic of' Iran r United Stoics o{A111erica) 12om1 
ICJ Reports 161. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/filcs/90/9715.pdf at 8 August 2008. 
22 Nio l)cf'iaratio11 on Em'iro11111e11r ancl /)n•e/op111c11r. UN Doc 
A/CON FI 'i I /'i/Rcv. I i 14 June 1992 ). 
2 ~ Mexico -- 1(tx Measures on ,'J'<!ff /)rinks und ()ther /Je,,erages, Wl'O [)oc 
WT/DS308/AB/R. AB-2005-10 (6 March 2006) (Appellate Body Report) ('Mexico -
.'·,oft /)rinks' J. 
45 
provision or the ICESCR, but rather_ what is necessary in terms or relaxation 
of WTO disciplines for the Member to fulfil its duties under the ICESCR. 
There arc narrower or more expansive ways or reading the idea ol consis-
tency between treaty norms in the ICESCR and those in the WTO. In this 
commentary, we have chosen to focus on a relatively narrnw conception: 
nan1cly the notion that one treaty regime should not undermine the existing 
ctlectivencss or the other. This docs not mean that in the longer run it would 
not be desirable to explore the possibility of restructuring the WTO system to 
enhance the capacity of states to respect. protect and fulfil the rights in the 
ICESCR. Our estimate is, however, that the current level of dissent about the 
relationship of trade liberalisation to economic dcvelopme11t. and the divergent 
views of different states on notions or equity in the WTO system, make this a 
dif!icult agenda to pursue for the rnomcnL from the perspective of the UN 
human rights institutions and the WTO itself. 
Instead, we have decided to concentrate 011 a set of situations where the 
concern is that the WTO treaty regime could operate to undermine ICESCR 
norms such that the effects would almost universally be viewed as unaccept-
able by states and peoples with different positions and perspectives on many 
of the fundamental debates about economic globalisation, development and 
global justice. 
Herc we avert to the concept or human security, as articulated in the 200] 
Report of the UN Commission on Human Security: 
lhlurnan security complements human development by deliberately locusin!,' on 
downside risks. It rccognil'.es the conditions 1ha1 menace survival, the continuation 
of daily life and the dignity or hurnan beings ... 1 luman security helps identify the 
rights at stake in a particular situation. And human right-, help answer the question: 
How should human security he promoted'12 -l 
A focus on human security so articulated is broadly consistrnt with the idea 
of 'minimum core obligation' and 'minimum essential levels' of economic, 
social and economic rights, which k1s been articulated by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ·cESCR' J. 2:<i 
Making economic, social and cultural rights as they rclatt..: to basic human 
security a priority, and addressing the risk or human security being under-
mined by the WTO treaty regime, is justified not only because or the broad 
consensus around human security-related norms, but also due to the fact that 
2-1 H111111111 Securily Nmr: Final Report <if rhe Co111111issi1111 011 flumun Sec1irir_, 
(United Nation;, Puhlications, New York, 2003) 10. http://v.-ww.humansecurity-chs.org/ 
finalrcport/indcx.html at 15 November 2008. 
2'> CESCR, Gc11cral Co111mc111 No 3: The N(l/llrc of Su11c Panics· 0/Jligarions. 
UN Doc E/I99I/23 (14 December 1990). 
The WTO a11d hu1111m rigllls 
the progressive f'ultillmcnt or all the rights in the ICESCR clearly depends on 
sucial ,md political conditions that arc fundamentally compromised when 
human security itself is threatened. A minimum or human security is in many 
ways a prerequisite for the social cooperation, citizen and worker participa-
tion, and good governance that arc needed if the full vision or the Covenant is 
to he achieved in each country. Conversely, when human security is menaced, 
whether by economic crisis, natural disaster or war, the acquis of social, 
economic and cultural rights can he rapidly undermined. Moreover, where 
human security it.self is threatened by the denial of economic, social and 
cultural rights, the rights in the J11ternatio11ul Covrnant 011 CiFil and Political 
Ri!!,hf.1· ('ICCPR')2<, are likely to be menaced or unachievable, as well. 
Not all Members of the WTO are parties to the ICESCR, but in the case of 
the human-security dimensions of rights such as the right to health, to food, 
and to work, even non-parties of the Covenant have participated in various 
legal and policy instruments and initiatives that affirm these dimensions. 
whether the declaration on core labor rights or the International Labor 
Organi1,ation ( 'ILO' )27 or the Food and Agricullurc Organi1.ation's ( 'FAO'} 
initiatives on rood sccurily, 2x or the World Health Organization's constitution, 
which affirms the right to health as rundamental. 2l) Moreover, the human secu-
rity dimensions of economic and social rights arc arguably already implicit in 
the notion or the right to life in the ICCPR. 10 
In our view, the connection or the rights in the ICESCR to human security 
makes these rights something more than provisions of a specialised treaty 
regime. They form part of what the Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission refers to as the 'normative environment' of the 
international legal order, which must he taken into account in interpreting and 
applying particular treaties. 11 This presupposes that there is a minimum 
substantive normativity inherent in the international legal order, a kind of 
foundation or floor, grounding the aspirations and efforts of the international 
legal system. It is our view that the notion of human security captures this 
~<i Opened for signature 1 (1 December 196(), l)l)l) UNTS 14668 (entered into 
force 23 March 197h). 
27 See /)ccfarufio11 011 F1111dm11rn1ol Princi;iles /11/{I Rights at Work ( I 998) ILO 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECl,ARATIONWEl:3.static __ jump'1var_language= 
EN&varpagename=DECLARATIONTEXT at 8 August 2008. 
20 Sec http://www.fao.org/ at 15 November 2008. 
2'1 Co11.11itutio11 of the World Hea!tli Orgu11i-;{1fio11, opened ror signature 22 .July 
1 lJ46, 2 Of/iciul Necords of' the World flcC1/th OrgC1ni-:.:atio11 100 (entered into force 7 




Sec Art 6( I) IC 'CPR. 
International I .,1w Commission. above n 3. 141 Sff. I. 
47 
minimum subst;mtive universal normativity. The idea or hu111,111 security as 
such a normative floor for the interpretation and ,ipplication or the WTO 
trc,1ties is acknowledged in the WTO Appellate Body's suggestion that WTO 
law must be interpreted and applied in light or the notion that the ·preserva-
tion orhuman life and health" is a value that •is vital and important in the high-
est degree·.-'~ 
The access to medicines and conflict di,1111onds examples suggest that the 
international trade regime would be open to human righh culture as a culture 
of human security. In the case of access to medicines. the WTO Members were 
prepared to modify the rights and obligations in TRIPS in order to facilitate 
affordable access to medications necessary to deal with devastating life-
threatening illncss. 33 In the case of conflict diamonds, the WTO Members 
created a waiver that arlirmcd as a mailer or legal certainty that Members 
could restrict trade in diamonds to conllict areas in a manner consistent ,vith 
their WTO obligations (this is especially 1wtahlc, because such restrictions 
could anyhow have been justiliable as an exception under the rclev.int WTO 
trealy).'-1 These examples show that the WTO as a treaty community is suscep-
tible to concerns or human security. 
In our view, there arc several dimensions to the downside risk that WTO 
norms may undermine or be inconsistent with the human security dimensions 
or social. economic and cultural rights; appreciation or these concrete dimen-
sions allows us lo 111ake very concrete suggestions as to how such ten~ions 
between treaty regimes can be addressed within the idiom and structures 01· 
international law. 
2. DOMESTIC POLICY SPACE 
Various WTO treaties contain constraints on the ability or WTO Mcrnhcrs to 
use domestic policy instruments, whether compulsory licensing in the case 01· 
TRIPS, subsidies including lood subsidies in the case or the S11/J.1iclic.1 wul 
Countervuifing Mea1111·cs i\grccmenl ( "SCM")-'-~ and the Agrcc111c111 on 
·'2 1:·11mpcwr C11111m1111ifies A1eu.111res 1t/1£'cli11g Ashe.1/os and ;\shc.1/os-
Co11tuini11g Pmi/11cts, WTO Doc WT/DS 115/AB/R {00-1157) AB-2000-11 L'1 i\pril 
2001) \1741 (Report or the Appellatl.' Body) ("FC--- A1hewo1· AB!?"). This rn,l.' is 
discussed below in connection with the right to health. 
33 Sec the !)oho /)cc/uratinn 011 tlu: TR/I'S Agree111cn1 und /'11h!ic lleulth. WTO 
Doc WT/MIN/01 )/DEC/2 (20 November 2001 ). 
q Sec ahovc n 9. 
3s Murm/.:.esh Agrce111cnr LsW/J/i.1/ring the World '/i-(1(/c 01:i;u11i::,u1io11, opened I'm 
signature 15 April 1994. 1867 UNTS 3 ( entered into force I January 1995 ), annex I A 
(S11hsiclic.1· and Co1111/cr\'(/i/i11g Mc11.rnrc.1 Agrcrnwnl). 
48 The WTO one! h11111a11 rights 
Agriculture,3r1 or industrial policy measures such as local content require-
111cnts.'7 In addition, WTO Members could bind themselves under the Gcnf'ml 
/\grccmcnt 011 Trude in Sen·ices ('CATS' ):,x to liberalise market access in 
sectors related to essential services, such as health care and water, limiting in 
important ways their ability to impose public goals related to the human secu-
rity dimensions of economic and social rights (such as universal affordable 
access to clean water) on private economic operators who have a right to 
participate in the market under the GATS commitments. So far, there have 
been kw cornrnitrnents negotiated that directly affect such public services; in 
the current round or negotiations, NGO activists have effectively raised aware-
ness or the risks to policy space, and to human rights, of acceding to demands 
or somt.: WTO Members for guaranteed market access in these arcas.'IJ 
With respect to policy space. there are several very specific legal challenges 
posed by the.sc aspects of the WTO regime. First. it must he ensured that exist-
ing llexihilities in the treaties, including exception and limitation clauses (such 
as those in Article XX GATT) arc interpreted was to allow WTO Members to 
meet their obligations with respect to human-security dimensions ol' economic 
and social rights. In addition, tht.: J'ull implementation of flexibilities that have 
already been added by agreement of WTO Members, for instance those based 
on the /)o/w /)ec/amtion on TRIPS mu/ Puhlic Health,40 must he guaranteed. 
Third, areas where enhanced or new flexibilities arc required in order to ensure 
that WTO Members can meet their obligations with respect to human security 
dimension.s of economic and social rights must be identified <for instance, the 
inclusion of emergency safeguards in the CATS and the creation of a 'safe 
ir, M11rm/,csh i\grc'c111e11I 1~·s1uhlishi11g Tire World 7i·ode Orguni;:iltion, orened !'or 
signature 15 Apri I 1994. 186 7 LINTS 1 ( enten:d into force I January 1995 L annex I A 
(Agrecnw111 on /\gricu[/tlre). 
n Such measures an: generally prohibited under the Mormkcsh Agrce111c111 
l:'.1111hfishi11g rlw World llrnle 01guni::111io11, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
LJNTS :1 (entered into force I January 1995 ), annex I A (i\grc('111c11/ 011 'fiwlc Re fared 
lll\'('.\[/11('/}/ M('{/_\1//'l'S) ('TRIMS'). . 
.rn Mormke.1/1 ;\grcc111c11/ !'.'stuhlishing tire World frw/c Orgil11i::alio11, opened for 
signature 15 April 1994. 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995). annex IB 
((;c11cm/ J\grl'n11c111 011 '/i-1/(fr in Se1Tices). 
,,> Sec. for example. Oxfam, /:'U H,1incris\' Uwnusked: W/Jv FU liwlc Policy 
I Ju rts nn·clo1J111c'11/ ( Oxfam, London, 2003 J Ox fa 111, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ 
1-csources/policy/trade/downloads/eu_hypocri~y.pdf al I 5 November 2008; The 
Alliance for Democracy, Sto11 rhe GJ\7S J\ttuck Nrm· 1 (2001 ), h1tp://www.1healliance-
forden10cracy.org/html/eng/l 331-A/\.shtml at I 5 November 2008; JD, 'Practical 
(iuidc lo the WTO', Chapter 5. at ht1p://www.]dthree.org/en/compleme11!. 
php'!IDcomplement=36 ( 15 November 2008). 
-•
11 /)cc/unr1io11 on the TRIPS l1f;lfl'IIICIII and Puhlic /-fro/th, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(0l J/DEC/2 ( 14 November 2001). 
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haven' for subsidies necessary for the realisation of human sccurity~rclatcd 
human rights). Finally, instances where propo....,cd new WTO disciplines. 
including additional co111mit111cnts in services sector lihcralisation. may risk 
constraining policies necessary to realise the human security dimensions of 
economic. social and cultural rights must be identified with as much precision 
as possible (for example, water privatisation and GATS). 
As a general matter, it is important that policy space he understood as a 
permissive concept: allowing flexibility to a WTO Member to use a particular 
policy instrument need not imply that this will be the optimal or desirable 
instrument for realising a given economic or social right in all contexts. For 
example, in some national contexts, monopolisation and privatisation of 
essential services may lead to greater access ,ind lower prices. thus helping to 
fulfil the economic and social rights in question: in others. the effects may he 
higher prices and universal access may be comprnmiscd. 
A. The Direct Effects on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights of 
Reduction in Trade 
While the trade policy community has generally assumed that reduction in 
explicit trade han-icrs such as tariffs leads to increased overall dolllc.stic 
welfare in WTO Members, more recent economic research has shown that 
opening up domestic markets to foreign competition leads to social and 
economic dislocation in many countries: this social and economic dislocation 
affects the enjoyment of human security dimensions or social and economic 
rights such as the right to work. 
The challenges we sec here arc firstly, to facilitate the best possible c.r 1111/e 
analysis of what the likely effects will be in a given country of increased 
competition from imports due to negotiated reduction or trade harriers, includ-
ing on particularly vulnerable groups. Additionally, where the overall balance 
of effects is positive, but there arc negative impacts on the enjoyment hy some 
individuals and groups or human security-rdated dimensions or eco110111ic, 
social and cultural rights, specific policy strategics must be formulated to 
address these possible negative impacts (adjustment policies, for ex,unplc) and 
to ensure that such policy responses arc permissible under WTO rules (which 
relates to policy space, as discussed above). Some of the strategics in question 
may imply agreement on technical assistance or development aid, in the case 
of developing countries. Third. in cases where the negative effects have not 
been anticipated, steps must be taken to ensure that there is sufficient po.s.si-
bility within the WTO treaty regime for temporary reversal of market opening 
commitments to deal with effects on human security dimensions of economic. 
social and cultural rights ('safeguards'), or through actual rebalancing of 
commitments of the particular WTO Member. Finally, the actual effects of 
'i() T/w WTO 111l/l /111111011 rig/Ifs 
trade liberalisation commitments on the enjoyment or human security-related 
di111c11.sions of economic, social and cultural rights must be analysed ex post, 
so as lo provide a basis where necessary for adjustment of commitments 
through rurthcr multilateral negotiations, where challenges appear to he com-
mon to a range or WTO Members. 
111 the next part of this chapter, we proceed to examine aspects of rights in 
the Covenant that arc directly and obviously connected to the concept of 
human security, and clements or which have been affirmed in terms of legal 
obligation in a variety of other instruments and institutions. We have chosen 
the right to work, the right to health and the right to food, although there arc 
others as well, no doubt. Civen our international law-based approach, we 
l"ocus on those aspects of the interaction of the WTO system with these rights 
that arc most closely grounded in existing treaty norms and their interpreta-
tion, related commitments and instruments, and matters that arc the subject of 
existing treaty-rule negotiations in the present Doha Round. 
3. THE RIGHTS TO WORK, HEALTH AND FOOD IN 
INTERACTION WITH THE WTO REGIME 
A. The Right to Work 
Article 6 of the Covenant provides: 
( 1 ) The States; Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
include, the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which 
he freely chooses or accepts. and will take appropriate \!cps to safeguard this right. 
(2) The steps to he taken by a Stale Party to the present Covenant to achieve the 
full realisation of this right shall includl.' technical and vocational guidance and 
training programs, policies and lechnique.s to achieve steady economic_ social and 
cultural developmcnt and full and productive employment under conditions safe-
guarding fundamental political and ectmomic fn:cdoms to lhl' individual. 
(i) Human security, international trade, and worker dislocation 
Thl'. human security di1nensio11 of the right to work has been idcntiiied by the 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body 
which monitors implementation and compliance with ICESCR, in its General 
Cmrnnent 18: 'The right to work contributes ... to the survival of the indi-
vidual and to that of his or her family ... '_-1-l Loss of employment from trade 
11 CESCR, Gc11cmf Com111c11t Nu I 8: l'lw Right to Work. UN Doc E/C. I 2/GC/18 
(6 February 2006) 111. 
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liheralis,1tion and foreign competition may threaten .-;urvival so understood 
unless appropriate adjustlllent policies arc undertaken. It should he recalled 
that the Preamble ol the WTO Agreement alforns the co111111itment of WTO 
Members that "their relations in the lield ol trade and ccunomic l'lldeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards or living, ensuring full 
cmpluymcnt and a large and steadily growing volume or real income and 
effective demamr. Roth the negotiation and npplication or WTO rules must he 
guided by this commitment, inler u!ia. to l'ull employment and raising stan-
dards of living, which may be regarded :is having largely incorporated the 
right to work into the WTO regimc_._i:, 
While the optinwl policies for moving toward full empluyment and higher 
standards of living may be a matter or controversy in the WTO, from a human 
security perspective on the right to work, there is an obligation to ensure th:1t 
survival-threatening jub losses due to trade liberalisation arc predicted and 
avoided as much as possible through the crafting or trade rule,; and conces-
sions, and that WTO rules permit to member states the policy sp<1cc to address 
the impact on the right to work through appropriate adjustlllent policies, such 
as retraining, education. and income support. This includes the kinds of poli-
cies explicitly indicated in J\rticlc 6(2) ICESCR. In this respect Wl'. note that 
the Secretariats of both the !LO and the WTO have e111phasised the importance 
of active labour market policies in tlH.:ir recent report on c111ploy111ent and 
trade: 
Active labour market policies may also he ,1 useful tuol to l'acilitatc adjustment to 
changes in the structure of production brought almut by trade lihcrali,mion. 
Measures Ill provide retraining lor displaced workers and job se,1rch as.sista11ce tu 
facilitate labour mobility will he import,rnt i11 thic. urn11L-clill11.._1' 
It should be acknowledged that many adjustment policies such ,ls funding 
for generally available vocational training arc entirely consistent \Vith WTO 
rules. However, as expl:1incd below, if policies arc targeted at specilic sectors 
or lin11s with adjustment needs, there is a risk of the policies being viewed as 
impermissible subsidies. 
What is firstly required is a serious effort to aso,;ess and cstimate c.r ill/le the 
possible negative cmploy111ent impacts of alternative positions in WTO nego-
tiations. with special attention to the duty of 11on-discri111inatio11 in Article 2(2) 
•1-' Along such lines. in the Slrri111pl!i1rtle case, the Appcllate Body found that the 
reference to ·sustainable development' in the Preamble made tht: international law of 
biodiversity relevant as a standard fur interprt:ting and applying relcv,tnt WTO norms: 
sec Shrimpffunlc [ 17[, [671. I 1:291, ID I I, 11'.'i:\ 1-
43 !LO and WTO. above n 11. 6--1-. 
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ICESCR and therefore the distrihutio11 of potential employment effects 
along gender lines as well as the other statuses enumerated therein. 
Complementing this would be the provision of technical assistance to States 
that arc unahlc otherwise to make such estimates, along with a structure and 
timetable to negotiations that permit such assessments to influence the 
negotiation of concessions and treaty rules in a timely and effective fash-
ion. Moreover, effective ·safeguard' provisions in WTO Agreements, which 
allow WTO Members adequate policy space to deal with negative effects of 
trade concessions on the right to work, must be introduced, especially 
where the effects have not been predicted or predictable through cx antc 
assessment. 
A fourth relevant measure would he a plan by each Member as to how it 
will safeguard the right to work given anticipated negative employment affects 
011 some sectors due to trade concessions. Finally, the program would be 
completed via interpretation and rerhaps modification of WTO rules on subsi-
dies and safeguards. and perhaps other rules as well. in order to allow WTO 
Members to address the threat to human security from trade liberalisation-
induced job losses (or indeed dislocation for other reasons that threatens 
human security). 
(ii) Subsidies 
Policies that rrovide a financial contribution to a recipient and a hcnelit (that 
is, a competitive advantage) and that arc specific to particular industries or 
sectors, may he actionahlc 'subsidies' under the SCM, depending on their 
effects on international trade. Article 8 SCM originally entailed a defined list 
of suhsidies to be deemed 'non-actionable', those subsidies were immunised 
from challenge in WTO dispute settlement as well as countervailing duty 
action, even if they were to be found to meet the criteria discussed above. 
This list included certain subsidies for research and development, environ-
mental protection, and to disadvantaged regions. However, this provision for 
deemed non-actionability applied provisionally, for only the first live years 
that the SCM was in force. Since its cfTcctive expiration, WTO Members 
have been unable to agree to either continue with the list as it now stands or 
to create a different list. Therefore, today there arc no subsidy programs that 
arc explicitly protedcd as non-actionable. During the Doha Round negotia-
tions, proposals from dcveloring countries (most notably Venezuela and 
Cuba) have emerged for the reinstatement of a category of non-actionable 
subsidics.44 
l-l Sec, c:.g. WTO doc. TN/RL/W /41 /Rev. l. IO March, 200]. 
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Based upon the _joint work of the ILO and the WTO, and in collaboration 
with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it should he 
possible to draw up a list or policy in.struments, including those ,tlready 
mentioned in Article 6 ICESCR, that may be nece.ss,iry for WTO Members to 
enact. in order to address the human security di mens ions ol" the right to work. 
and particularly to prevent the threat to human security through loss or 
employment from trndc-libcralisation induced industrial dislocation. These 
policy instruments could form part of a new ·non-actionable' category in an 
amended SCM in the Doha Round. 
Moreover, in the case of those instruments explicitly indicated in Art 6 
SCM, any interpretation of the agreement should be based on a presumption 
thut, since most WTO Members were bound by the ICESCR when they nego-
tiated the SCM, Members deemed the instruments in question consistent with 
SCM. This derives from the basic international law principle that. to the 
extent possible, the interpretation or one treaty should not render obligations 
under other treaties ineffective. This may have significance in the intcrpret,i-
tion or specificity, which is a complex judgment not determined by bright line 
rules. 111 particular, Article 2.1 (h) SCM appears to be aimed al guaranteeing 
some policy space !'or subsidies that arc provided on the basis or 'objective 
criteria': 
Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to \\-'hich the granting 
authority operates. e,1.;tablishcs objective criteria or conditions governing the eligi-
hility for, and the anrnunl ol', a subsidy, ,pcciticity shall not l'Xi.,l. prnvidcd that the 
eligibility is automalic and that such criteria and conditions arc strictly adhered to. 
The criteria or conditions mmt be clearly spelled out in law, regulation. or other 
ofiicial document, so as to be capable of verification. 
Arguably, subsidy measures aimed at realising the right to work should he 
deemed to have been understood to rail within the notion or measures based 
on 'objective criteria or conditions·, where the features of these programs arc 
reasonably related to the right to work as articulated in Article (i or the 
CovL:nanl. 
TRIMS identifies some investrnent-related 111easures that arc deemed to he 
impermissible under the WTO. These include me,1sures that require an enter-
prise to use local content or sourcing in its production activities; such measures 
arc deemed to be inconsistent with Article Ill:4 GATT. the national treatment 
obligation. However. TRIMS also provides that the exceptions otherwise 
applicable to the GATT apply as well in the case of TRIMS that arc deemed to 
violate specific provisions of the GATT. Thus. where a Member needed to 
impose such requirements in the context of a national economic crisis, for 
instance, to prevent the enjoyment of the right to work being undermined. the 
measures might be _justi1iable under Article XX(a) GATT, as necessary for the 
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rrotection or public morals. 111 the US - Gw11/Jli11g45 decision, the Appellate 
Body rcrerred to public morals in Article XIV GATS as concerning "the 
preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public 
policy and law' _4r, Almost by dclinition, rights recognised intern~1tionally c:111 
be considered ·ru11dame11tal interests ... as reflected i11 ... law'. 
With respect to the right to work as it is relevant to employment in service 
industries, the G/\TS docs not contain any explicit disciplines on subsidies in 
the context of services. The i'uture negotiation of such provisions is anticipated 
by Article XV (_i/\TS, which recognises the role of subsidies in the develop-
ment programs of developing countries. 
It has been argued that the national treatment obligation in the GATS. 
which prohibits discrimination against like services and service providers or 
other WTO Member~, would make subsidies targeted al local workers ques-
t ionahlc.'-17 However, a WTO Member might be able to offer subsidies to any 
service provider with a commercial presence and the capacity to create 
employment or train workers in the Member concerned. 
Article XIX GATT provides that a WTO Member may impm,c 'safeguards' 
on a temporary basis. increasing tariffs above the ceilings it has committed in 
WTO negotiations, under certain circumstances where a domestic industry is 
sufkring injury due to surges in i111ports. The definition or injury includes i11tN 
uliu a situatiun of declining employment. In light of the right to work the 
narrow interpretation or saft:guards that is prevalent in WTO jurisprudence 
may need to be re-examined. A .'>trict demonstration that the event.'> leading to 
the surge of imports could not reasonably have been foreseen has been 
required by the Appellate Body in order for a member to invoke safeguards, 
and also a strict demonstration of a casual relation between the surge of 
imports and the injury.48 Since it is hard through economic methodology to 
identify a surge in imports as a factor separate from others affecting the fate of 
an industry, 1'! the consequence is that safeguard relief is very difficult to come 
1" United SJ({/c.1 /\.fr(l1·1m'.1 Afli'cfi11g Ilic Cross /Jorda S1111plv n( Uelli11g (/fl/I 
(;u111hli11g Sc1Ticcs, WTO Doc WT/DS28.'i//\B/R. /\B-200.'i-l (7 /\pril 200.'i) !Report 
ol" the Appel late Body) (·US -- Cc1111/J!i11g' ). 
-1-I, US - (;w11/J/i11g [2lJ6J. 
·17 Sec. for cxa111plc, Report ol" the United Nations High Commissioner for 
I luman Rights_ Uhcmfbllion of frudc in Scn·ice.1· ond l/111w111 Rig/11s. UN Doc 
[jCN.4/Suh.2/2002/lJ (2:i .lune 2002) !(10J. 
iX l!11itccl Siu/es Su/c'gu({rd Mm.1wc.1· 0/1 !111por/s of Fresh, Chilled or Fm::.cn 
/ ,(//11/J_fim11 New 1/ni/1111d 1111d /\.uslmliu. WTO Doc WT/DS 177/AB/R, WT/DS I 7H/AH/R, 
/\B-2001-1 ( I May 200 I l ( Report of the Appellate Body) JI 66J_ 1172 I ('US - /11111/J' ). 
I'! Sec Gene Grossman and Petros Mavroidis. 'United States -· Definitive 
Sakguard Measure, for Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Linc Pipe from 
Kmca' in 11 I lorn ,1ml P Mavroidi-., (eds) The WTO Cme l"uii· of" 2002 (Cambridge 
University Press. New York_ 2005) 122. 
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by in the WTO. Horn and Mavroidis have argued that the rationale for sale-
guards should he seen in si!lnificant measure as to address social adjustmcnl 
costs from \r,tdc lihcralisali<~n. 511 · 
In lighl ol that consideration, ,trc such rc,tdings or the treaty tcxt.s in quc.s-
tion really required. especially given the right to work is relkctcd in the ·full 
employment' objective stated in tile WTO Agreement Preamblc'1 Of course, 
safeguards may have negative impacts on the right to work in the countries or 
export that arc consequently faced with higher tariffs. However. there arc other 
facets that balance this concern of the exporting country with the concern for 
adjustment of the importing country and its workers. These include the 
requirement that safeguard relief he temporary and that compensation he 
offered to affected exporting states. Also, there is an obligation on the state 
taking safeguards to take other adjt1.'->tme11t measures to ensure that the under-
lying problem is addressed. A proper understanding or the right to work could 
be relevant lo delining appropriate compensation. determining whether there 
is an ongoing _justification for sakguards, and what alternative adjustmc:nt 
policies a Member can be expected lo lake lo address the underlying siluation. 
In thi.'-> context, ii should he noted tha! the WTO contains a mechanism for 
examining the trade-related policies of WTO Members and their effects, the 
Tmde Polin' Review Mcclw11is111 ("TPRM' J. 51 The !unction or the TPRM is 
staled as the 'impact of a Mcmher·s trade policic.'-> and practices 011 the multi-
lateral trading system'. As already noted, the WTO Agn:e111cnt (to which the 
TPRM treaty is annexed) stale.'-> ;is an objective ol the WTO. inter alio. that 
'relations in !he licld of track and economic endeavour should be conduckd 
with a view to raising standards or living, ensuring full employment and a 
large and steadily growing volume or real income and clTcctivc demand'. The 
references to 'raising standards of living' and 'full employment' suggest that 
the mandate of the TPRM should include a consideration or the effects ol 
trade and related policies. including those implementing WTO rules, on the 
realisation of the right to work. But this !urns out not lo he the ca.'->c. Take for 
cxaniple. the policy review of Senegal earlier in this decade. The Secretariat 
reporl docs note policies ol Seneg~!I thal have impacts on the realisatinn of the 
objectives in the WTO Preamble, including positive initiatives to enhance 
:;o Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis, "What Should he Required of a Sal"cguard 
Investigation. A Discussion of the Appellate Body Report on U11i1ed S1otcs - Su/l'g11u1d 
Measures 011 lnrpor1.1· of Fresh. Chilled or Fm;cn Lmnh Meu/ .fi"/1111 Nc11· /.c(lfilll{I (//Id 
Austruliu' in H Horn and P Mavroidis (eds) The WTO Cusc Lem o/200/ (Cambridge· 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 72. 
~ 1 Murrukesh Agree:11ent h,'s1uhli1hi11g !he World Tmcle Orgc111i:mio11, opened for 
signature 15 April 1994. 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force l January 1995), annex 3 
(1irnle Polin· lfrl'icw Mfflw11i.1·111) Art A( i ). 
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educational and workforce opportunities for women.:i2 On the other hand, the 
report docs not consider how Senegal's trade and related policies, such as 
privati1.ation. may either enhance or threaten such initiatives, which have 
obvious relevance to the right to work. 
(iii) Human security, trade in people, and the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services 
While the above discussion has focused, in relation to the right to work, on the 
risk lo human security from loss of employment opportunities, human security 
can also he threatened by certain conditions of work. The right to work has im-
portant implications for the situation of migrant and trafficked workers,-" 1 for 
example, whose treatment often raises issues of human security. Under the 
WTO, CiATS liberalisation or trade in services includes so called Mode 4 
trade, the temporary physical presence of the service provider in the host coun-
try. The characterisation of persons who temporarily go to another WTO 
Member country for purposes of employment as transboundary 'service 
providers' rather than workers, raises the issue of whether it is an assumption 
or CATS that such persons arc to he exempt from the protections of labor or 
human rights regulation, either in the host or the home country or both. 
Under the GATS so far there have been only limited commitments by indi-
vidual WTO Members to liberalise Mode 4 services trade. There is thus the 
opportunity for human rights institutions to focus on the relationship of such 
commitments to the right to work, providing guidelines on how WTO Members 
should define such commitments in light of their obligation with respect lo the 
right lo work - at a minimum. in such a way as to not further undermine the 
human security or migrant and trafficked workers. For example with respect to 
the existing commitments under GATS, Caroline Dommen notes: 
Most countries that have made CATS Mode 4 commitments also provide for wage 
and labor standard parity I with indigenous workers!. Over 50 WTO membcr.s have 
included the wage-parity stipulation in their Mode 4 commitments. In addition. to 
prevent fon:ign "strike breakers' 22 members have reserved the right to suspend 
Mode 4 commitments in the event of labor-management disrutes_'.'-1 
Y' Sec Trude Policv Rn·iew Hod,• - fradc Polin· Re1'inr -- Scnego/ -- Report /;y 
the· Sccrc·1orio1. WTO Doc WT/TPR/S/ 11 LJ ( 30 June 2003 J. 
·'·
1 The concept of trafficking includes not only obviously non-consen~ual move-
ment of workers (with coercion or threat of force) but also movement that constitutes 
exploitation, which would include subjection to employment conditions threatening to 
human security, that is denial of the minimum human conditions of work as required 
by the cure content ol J\rt 6 ICESCR. Sec Jacqueline Bhahha, 'frqfficking, Smuggling 
all/I lfomun Rights (March 2005) Migration Policy Institute, http://www.rnigrationin-
formation.org/fcature/display.cfm'1l D=294 at 8 August 2008. 
-'·1 Caroline Donuncn. Migrnnts' /11111w11 Rights: Could GATS llelp" (March 
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l3uilding upon these individual country experiences with scheduling 
co111111itmcnts, it would be useful for the ILO, tht: WTO and UN bodies 
concerned with migration and traflicking to collaborate on a set or guidelines 
for scheduling future commitn1ents under GATS Mode 4 in order to protect the 
human security of migrant or trafficked workers. This might include the possi-
bility or excluding from commitments altogether sectors or sub-sectors where 
trafficking is rampant. 
At the same time, even apart from the specific commitments that WTO 
Members make with respect to Mode 4 under GATS, the Most-Favoured-
Nation clause applies generally to all services trade. This means that, whether 
or not it has made specific commitments, a WTO Member cannot discriminate 
between different countries in its approach to regulating services. This raises 
the issue of whether, even if it had not made any specific commitments, a 
WTO Member could restrict or prohibit trade in workers from a country that 
is not taking effective measures to deal with trafficking problems. Presumably 
here the public morals exception lo CATS obligations could be invoked 
(Article XIV(a) GATS). The right to work might he used as part of the nonna-
tive context for interpreting this exception. Again, since there is lillle aware-
ness or attention in the WTO to the situation of migrant and traflicked workers, 
it is important that the relevant agencies provide guidance as to appropriate 
measures l"or addressing the human security ol" such persons. to ensure tlwt the 
GATS is interpreted in a manner that allows such measures to be taken and to 
be effective. 
B. The Right to Health 
Article 12 ICESCR provides: 
I. The States Parties to the present Covenant recogni,.e the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Partit.:s to the present Coven,tnl to 
achieve the rull realisation or this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction or the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development or the child: 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene: 
2005) Migration Policy Institute, http://www.migratio11i11rnr111ation.org/Feature/ 
display.cfm'!iu=290 at 8 August 2008. 
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(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic. occu-
pational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure lo all medical 
service and medical attention in the event of sickness. 
(i) Trade in goods 
A fundamental aspect of the right to health is the duty of the state to protect 
against disease and related health risks - especially, from a human security 
perspective those that are life-threatening or can result in a fundamentally 
reduced capacity to live with dignity. As the dramatic examples of avian 
inlluenza and mad cow disease illustrate, in an era of globalisation threats to 
health security can spread across national boundaries at breakneck pace. 
through the movement of goods and natural persons. 
Several WTO treaties have provisions that could limit the ability of WTO 
Members to control the entry and conditions of sale of imported products in 
order lo discharge their duty under Article I 2(2)(c) of the Covenant. 
In the /:"C -Asheslos case, Canada challenged a health-based ban by France 
on all asbestos and asbestos-containing products, whether domestic or 
imported. The panel held that asbestos and asbestos-containing products were 
'like' substitute products on the domestic market in France, and therefore that 
France had violated Article 111:4, the National Treatment provision, which 
requires that 'like' domestic and i 111ported products be treated even-
handedly.55 In effect, the panel was saying that a product that has a long 
history of causing loss or human life has to he treated under WTO law the 
same as a non-lethal substitute, for the sake of free trade. The Appellate Body 
reversed this ruling, finding that the panel erred in law in deciding that health 
effects could not he taken into account in the determination of likeness, and 
went on lo lind that, on account of the different health effects that stemmed 
from the different physical characteristics of, respectively, asbestos and substi-
tute products that were permitted in France, thcse·two groups of products were 
'unlike': there was thus no violation of National Treatmcnt. 56 From the 
perspective of the right to health, this is a landmark ruling, because it indicates 
that considerations of health as a human value must be considered not only in 
interpreting and applying exceptions to WTO disciplines, but in understanding 
the very scope of those disciplines themselves. Even where an exception exists 
- as it docs for measures necessary to protect, inter olia, human health - at the 
same time WTO Mernbers should not he lightly assumed to have undertaken 
~~ /~'uropeon ('0111nu1nities - J\.1eosures 1'\ff'ecting /\shc,\los and /3roducls 
Co111ui11/11g /'1s/Jeslo.1, WTO Dllc WT/DS 11.'i/R ( 18 September '.WOO) 419/l. (Report of 
the Panel j ( '/:·c · - Ashes1u1· Pl?'). 
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in Hie lirs1 place substantive obligations that arc inconsistent with the right to 
health, when those ohligatio11s can he read ,111d applied otherwi~;e. consistenl 
with the rules ol i111crpretatio11 in the VCLT. 
111 this respect, it is significant thal the Appellate Body went on. even 
!hough it had already 1-c,Trscd the panel's linding or a violation of 111:4, to 
make a point of indicating that France's rneasure would in any case have been 
justified under the health exception in Article XX. In so doing. the Appellate 
Body noled thal: 'it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right 10 deter-
mine the level of protection or health that they consider appropriate in a given 
situation·. Further the Appellate Body held: 
The 1rnne vital m important I the I cclll111l(lll intcn:.,h ur value.s pursued. the easiL·r ii 
would he to accept ·necess;1ry· measure, designed lo achieve tho,l' cmk In thi;.. 
case. the objective pursued hy the 111c,N1rc is the prcscrv,1tio11 ol hunia11 lilc and 
health through the eliminalion. or reducti()Jl. ol the well-knuwn. and lik-
thrcatcning. health risks posed hy asbestos lihrcs. The valui: pu1·sucd is both vital 
and important in the highest dcgrcc.'i 1 
It is clear that where the WTO adjudicatm concludes that 'the value 
pursued is both vital and important in the highest degree·. an additional degree 
or delcrence will be afforded tu domestic regula1ory action airned at vindic1t-
ing the value in question: this in it-.L'lr suggests a particular role for !he rights 
in the Covenant. By binding thernselws to respect. protect and fullil 
economic. social and cultural rights, the p,1rtics to the Covenant evidence the 
acceptance or the human values underlying the rights as fundamental -- ha, ing 
priority over less runda111ental. or secondary. lnurnm interests. 
(ii) Domestically prohibited products 
The issue or domestically prohibited produL·ts illustrates the complexity or the 
Right to Health in relation to WTO discipline-,_ Article XI GATT bans rL'stric-
tions and prohibitions on exp()rts. Where a WTO Men1hn prohibits the sale of 
a product 011 grounds ol health ri-.;ks. the member may enact such a ban with-
out regard to whether the sale is domestic or for export. In such a siluation, 
where the 111easurc is not targeted at exports in particular, would that aspect 
nevertheless violate Article XI G/\TT) From a right to lll'alth perspective, such 
a prohibition as applied to exports could be seen as a 1·ulfil111cnt or the duty to 
engage in international cooperation to ful1il the right to health. There arc 
concerns that developed countries could 'dump· products which arc viewed as 
dangerous to health in their domestic spheres on developing countries. which 
may have limited resources and capacities to detect health risks \vhen products 
l'.C·~·i\s/JcsrosABR 1172]. 
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cross the border. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health: 
Sometimes drugs, rejected in the North because they have passed their l:xpiry date, 
arl'. sold in the South. Thus, Stales need to h:1ve in plm:l'. a bw,ic system for moni-
toring l'.ssential drug quality ... The duty lo respect requires States to refrain from 
interfering, directly or indirectly. with the enjoyment of the right to health. Thus_ a 
Stale should not market unsafe drugs.58 
However, on some scenarios the imposition or export controls based on 
domestic regulatory approaches could undermine the country of irnportation's 
ability to decide on what is required lo protect the right to health of its own 
citizl'.ns. Takl'. the example of new L'.xperirnental medications to treat 
HIV/AIDS. In countries such as the US, such medications may be only avail-
able legally on the market after years of clinical trials to ensure their relatively 
benign effect on human health. Another country's government may determine 
however that the right to health requires allowing patients access to such novel 
treatments more rapidly - especially if their health condition is grave in the 
short term. The logic of a humanity-based conception of international law is 
that the obligations of human rights arc not limited to a state's own citi1.cns. 
However, the ICESCR aflinns a norm or self-determination in Article l, 
suggesting that each society is entitled to a large degree of autonomy in real-
ising its course of social and economic development. 
The issues raised by export of domestically prohibited products have not 
received any definitive treatment in the WTO itself.."il/ There is a gap here, as 
the treaty texts do not seem to explicitly address this dilemma, and thus an 
opportunity to frame this issue, inasmuch as it relates to human health, in 
terms of the right to health. 
(iii) The right to health, the TRIPS Agreement, and access to essential 
medicines -
Article JI TRIPS provides the Hcxibility for WTO Members to compulsory-
license patented goods. where certain conditions arc met, including reasonable 
compensation to the rights-holder, and provided the license only applies to the 
iX Paul Hunt, Re11or/ of' the Special R.afJ11orle11r 011 the Right of' /--,\-en'onc ro the 
t,',1jov111cnt of'thc Highest Availohlc Standard of' Ph\·sical and Mmtal J-/callh. UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.l (I March 2004) [38H401. 
YJ The issue is largely unaddrcsscd in the scholarly literature, with the rare 
l'.xception ol' Tobias Bender. "Unilatcralc Exportverbotl'. vun Domestically prohibited 
goods zum Umwclt: dcr Ccsundheitsschutz im Ausland und ihre Rel'.htmlif.\igkeit nach 
dem GATT cin Betrag: zur Dugmatik der Artikel 11 und XX GATT' (2003) 4 Zeitschrifi 
jlir m1slii11clisches iif/1'11tliches Recht 1111(/ Vii/kerrecht I (J{l7, 
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market of the WTO Member in questio11, Despite this lkxihility, which is even 
greater where an emergency situation exists (some of the cunditions arc lifted), 
drug industry interests and some developed government.-: tried to discourage 
developing countries who sought to use this 11exibility tu address the health 
crisis of HIV/AIDS, by taking an extremely narrow view of the flexibilities in 
question, The TRIPS division of the WTO Secretariat appears to have largely 
collaborated in this undertaking, sending a message as to the strictness or 
TRIPS disciplines, and underemphasising the flexibilities, 
In response, the WTO /)o/w /)cc/orotion on the '/J?f PS Agrce111c111 (/1/d 
Puh/ic Heolth made clear that the TRIPS Agreement should not provide obsta-
cles to the availability ol' essential medicines at affordable prices, at least in 
relation to certain critical diseases. Article 4 reads: 
We agrcL'. that the TRIPS Agreement docs not and should not prevent Member~ t"rom 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our co11m1it-
mc11t to the TRIPS Agreement. we af'1irm that the Agreement can and should he 
interpreted and implemented in a manner \Upportive or WTO Members· right lo 
protect public health, and in particular. to promote access to medicine\ l'or ,di. 
Article 5 specilies some of the implications of this aflir111atio11: 
I I Including the right to grant cornpulsmy licenses and the rreedo111 to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of' extreme urgency, 
it being understood that public health crises. including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
In the debate over the usefulness of compulsory licensing as an instrument 
lo ensure affordable access lo essential medicines, it was widely put about that 
Article 3 I TRIPS did not cover a situation where a developing country wanted 
to grant a compulsory license in respect oi' ,1 drug it was importing. that is 
manufactured in another country. Thus, ii" an African country with no indige-
nous capacity to manufacture compulsorily licensed products wanted to 
import for its domestic market a generic from India. it could not, it was 
believed, use Article 31 TRIPS. India could only grant a compulsory license 
for the Indian domestic 111arket according to the terms of the sa111e. This argu-
ment ignores the exception of Article 30 TRIPS_r,o There arc good reasons to 
(,() Article 30 TRIPS reads as follows: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred hy a 
patent, provided tlrnt such exceptions do not unrcasonahly conl"lict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the lcgitimall' intcresh 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate intcrc--.ts of third parties. 
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lhink thal !he granling of a compulsory license could be extended to the market 
in anolher WTO Member country as an Article 30 TRIPS exception, where 
that other WTO Member indicates that were it to possess its; own manufactur-
ing capacity, it would itself have granted such a license for production or 
generics domestically. Such an exception docs not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent, in the sense that the government of the importing 
state would be entitled to limit anyhow the patent-holder's right through 
compulsory licensing, and the only thing that prevents it from doing so is a 
current lack of manufacturing capacity domestically. It would not fundamen-
tally undermine the palent holder's legitimate interesls because, in the case of 
a poor country, the amount or revenue forgone would not be subslanlial, and 
in any case the counlry granting the license (India) would slill have to comply 
with various conditions (albeit mitigated by the emergency nature or the silu-
ation in the case of HIV/AIDS drugs). For these reasons, in our view, the prob-
lem or a poor country not having domestic manufacturing capacity could be 
solved within the four corners of TRIPS. 
However, especially in light of various interpretations issued by !he indus-
try and to some cxtenl rrom within !he WTO Secretariat, many developing 
countries wanted additional legal security on this point. Thus, Article (1 of the 
Declaration provides: 
We rccogni1,c that WTO Members with insulficicnt or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector could race difncultics in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS J\grl.'.ement. We instruct the Council for 
TRIPS to Jind an expeditious solution to this problem and to report lo the General 
Council before the end ol 2002. 
The resulting agreement, as Correa explains: 
IT lakes the form of an interim waiver, which allows countries producing patented 
products under compulsory license tu exporl th<.'. products to eligible importing 
countries, provided that a compulsory license has :!lso been granted in the import-
ing country. 1' 1 
According to Correa, however, this solution is not very practicable, given 
,tll the onerous conditions that must he fullilled lo take advantage of the 
waiver. including. the requirement that !he product ror export be clearly 
distinguishable from the patented version in appearance ( ·shape, coloring, 
labeling and packaging'), and the provision of exact information about the 
quantities being produced and shipped, as well as imposing responsibility on 
r,i Carlo~ Correa. ·Acces~ lo drugs under TRIPS: A not so expeditious solution' 
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the generic producer 1·or proving the 'hio-cquivalcncc' ol.thc generic product 
and the possibility, ii' data arc not di-;closcd by the patent-holder. that ii would 
have lo conduct its own toxicity and crJicacy studiL'S. In Correa\ view. these 
various conditions entail such costs for generic manufacturers that the solu-
tion will be of no practical benefit to poor countries who l,ick their own manu-
facturing capacity. Moreover, whether a developing country does or docs not 
have such capacity is not a rnallcr of self-declaration, but is subject to chal-
k11gc, for instance. if a developed WTO Member questions the ·actual exis-
tence of incapacity. 
Corrca's skepticism scL:ms vindicated by virtue of the fact that only one 
importing country has thus l'ar declared its intention to use the 111echanis111_r,:i 
J\ recent Ox1·a111 hrie(ing paper notes: 
Rich countries. rrn· their part, seem to he in no hurry to make it work. M:111y h:1vc· 
been slmv Ill implement the deal. and no country ha, SULTL'ssfully used the mecha-
nism to export medicines to countries with i11s11f1iL·ient ma11ui'.1cturinl,'. capacity. The 
lJSA ha;; not c,wctcd legislation Ill implement the solution. whik the h1ropca11 
llnion only apprnn:d regulations implcrnc11ti11g the puhliL· health sulution in rnid-
2006_(,J 
Rich countries th,11 did i111ple111ent the law made it more complicatcd. 
Despite the efforts of civil-society groups and generic manufacturers, Can,1da 
enacted legislation that has proved 'unworkable' according to Mcdecins Sans 
FronticrL:s ('MSF'). which spent two years trying to export generic ARVs 
under Canada\; legislation.M The inability of the Paragraph 6 solution to 
deliver mL:dicines is a serious threat to the legitimacy of the WTO. The current 
WTO Director-Cieneral has just started to acknowledge the solution's present 
weakness. Civil-society skepticism towards P,1ragrnph 6 is sh,1rcd by most 
countries. By October 2006. only three countries, the USA, Swit1erland and 
6
~ Sec W'f'() l)oc IP/N/9/RW/\/I (nutiflL·ation hv R,v~uHln to [111port l"ronl 
Canada: 17 July. 2001); sec also WTO Doc IP/N/10/CAN/I (11otificatio11 hy Canada to 
export to Rwanda: 8 October. 2007). 
tiJ Oxl'arn Canada. U1j{1111 Cunwlu '.I S11/J/11is.1·im1 ro Cn11s11!1u1io11 011 ( ·mwdr1 's 
Access to Medicines Reginw (Oxfam, Ontario, 2007) http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/ 
review-re\'iser/canir_rcam_oxfam_22-rng.pdl' at I :'i November 2008. 
r,-1 MSf Canada, Neither 1:·.\pcditim1s. Nor o Soillfion: The W70 Augus/ 30th 
/)ecision is U1111·orku/J/e, (Paper prepared for the XVI Intcrnatinnal AIDS 
Conference, Toronto. Augu,l 2006) http://www.msl.ca/fcatures/aids2006/ 
files/REP _JCPA_cn.pdf at l ."i November 2008; MSF Canada. Too /,illfcfi1r '/iJo Fell·: 
Clwlle11ges fin· h'f/c'cli\'e 011d Accessi/J/e i\111iretm1·iml Thcmvr ( Briefing documrnt 
prepared for the XVI International AIDS Conference. Toronto. August 2006) 
http://www.msf.ca/fcatures/aids2.006/filcs/REP _IAChricfingdoc_Cll.pd1 at 1."i 
November 2008. 
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El Salvador, had formally accepted the solution.65 That said, by the end of 
2008. numerous other parties had come to the table, including the Republic of 
Korea, Norway, India, the Philippines, Israel, Japan, Australia, Singapore, 
China and Hong Kong, the European Communities, Mauritius. Egypt, 
Mexico, Jordan and Brazil.66 
The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health noted in 2004: "the effec-
tiveness of the Decision Ion Implementation of Paragraph 6] will depend on 
the extent to which it actually does lead to increased access to medicines for 
the poor' .r,7 The failure to implement adequately the decision, and the nature 
of the measures taken by WTO Members pursuant to the Decision should 
arguably be examined in depth from the perspective of the right to health. Herc 
we arc dealing with the frustration of rights under WTO law acquired after 
protracted negotiations, which has clearly negative consequences fur human-
security related dimensions of the right to health. 
C. The Right to Food 
Article I I of the Covenant provides: 
I. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of every-
one to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate food. clothing and housing. and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropri-
ate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free 
consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and 
through international co-operation, · the measures, including ,-;pccilic 
programmes, which arc needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of 
food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by 
ii'i Oxfam International, 'Patents versus Patients: Five Years after the Doha 
Declaration· (Oxfam Briefing Paper 95, Oxfam International, 2006) Section 5, 
http://www.oxfam.lirg.uk/what_wc __ do/issues/health/downloads/hp95_patents.pdf 
M For a complete list of parties to the 30 August 2003 waiver and the 6 
December 2005 motion that amended TRIPS, sec http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_c/ 
trips_e/amendment_e.htm at 15 November 2008. 
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disseminating knowledge or the principles or nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as lo 
achieve the most ef'iicient development and utili1,ation of nalural 
resources: 
(b) Taking into account the problems or both food-importing and food-
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution or world 
food supplies in relation to need. 
General Comment 12 on the right to food defines the responsibilities of slates 
at the intL:rnational lcvd among others: (a) to respect the right to rood in other 
countries; (b) to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary food aid 
when required, but in a manner that docs not adversely affect local producers 
and markets; and (c) to ensure that in international agreements the right to food 
is given adequate considcration_hS 
A 2002 report ol' the Ortice or the UN High Commissioner for Hurrn111 
Rights ("OHCHR') considered in depth the implications of agricultural trade 
rules and negotiations in the WTO for, inter (1/io, lhc right to food. 6'> 
Determining an optinrnl set or international trade rules from the perspective uf 
fully realising the righ1 to food is a daunting task: the accessibility of food al 
affordable prices and adequate nutritional quality may depend 011 a careful 
balance or clements or local capacity and self-suf1iciency and open and 
competitive world markets. The current rules in the WTO Agree111c11I 011 
Agric11/turc may not strike such a balance, requiring 100 much liberalisation or 
developing countries· agricultural markets that threatens local capacity and 
self-sufficiency. on the one hand, and 1101 requiring sufficient liberalisation or 
developed country agricultural markets, on the other. 70 But the negotiations on 
agriculture in the Doha Round reflect considerable controversy and uncer-
tainty as to the best mix ol' lihcralisalion commitments and safeguards or some 
aspects of local production. 
Even apart from the challenge of devising an optimal set of rules to 
promote food security through ngricultural twdc liberalisation, however, there 
is, from a human security perspective, the more basic, and arguably less 
controversial challenge of ensuring that whatever set of rules is in place docs 
not have negative effects. including short-term effects. on the realisation of the 
right to food. and that governments remain able to discharge their responsibil-
ities with respect to the right to food through direct policies such as consumer 
6~ CESCR. Gcncrol Co111111en1 No 12: The Righi lo Fnod. UN Doc 
E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999J 136]. 
69 See LJNHCHR. above n 5 (22 April 2003). 
70 Sec for example, Jean Ziegler. Re/JOrl of rhe Spcciul Rn/J/)01"/c11r 011 rile Righi 
ro Foocl, UN Doc l-:/CN.4/2006/44 ( 16 March 200(1) 1401. 
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subsidies that ensure that food is affordable to their citizens despite price 
fluctuations on world markets. Along similar lines, the WTO rules concerning 
export subsidies on agricultural products must be compatible with the proper 
role ol' i'ood aid in assuring the right to i'ood. In other words, whatever the 
overall design of agricultural trade liberalisation in the WTO may be, there 
need to be certain specific legal safeguards or mechanisms to protect the right 
to i'ood in its most basic human-security related dimensions. 
Although not articulated in terms of the right to food. the Marrakesh 
Decision that accompanied the Uruguay Round Agrt'e111e111 on 1\gricu/ture 
reflects a recognition of this need for specific safeguards and 111echanisrns. 
Because Net Food-Importing Developing Countries ( 'NFIOCs') may experi-
ence higher food prices due to the reduction ol' export subsidies as required in 
the Agreement on Agriculture, special mechanisms arc to be made available 
under the Marrakesh decision to counter such negative effects. including the 
establishment or financing mechanisms to ensure affordable acce.s,sibility of 
imported food. 71 As well, a new Food Aid Con11e111ion was to be established, 
to lay down appropriate criteria for the granting of food aid consistent with 
WTO rules. The Convention came into force in 1999.72 
It is widely acknowledged that a number of the specific mechanisms envis-
aged by the Marrakesh Decision have never been implemented, in particular 
those requiring compensation or financial assistance to NFIDCs. Despite 
concerns expressed by the l~AO and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development ('UNCTAD' ), both the International Monetary Fund ('IMF') 
and the WTO have apparently decided not to move forward on such assistance.n 
The effects of the failure to implement the Marrakesh Decision on the right to 
food deserve urgent attention: the undertakings in the Decision were integral to 
the bargain on agricultural trade liberalisation negotiated in the Uruguay Round. 
Moreover, in 2007 the Food J\id Cm111e111io11 was up for renegotiation: the 
deadline for the necessary conversation has since lapsed and the Convention 
has expired. 74 It may yet be resurrected, btit it is important that proposals for 
71 Sec /)ecision 011 Mca.111res ( ·011ccmi11g the Possible Neg11tivc l:'f.fiYts of the 
Re/i11w /'mgri1111111c 1111 Lc(l.1·t-fJc1•clopcd am/ Net Food-ln11!orring ne1·clo11i11g 
Co1111rries, WTO Doc G//\GtJ. J.1-4 (15 Decemher 1993 and 14 April 1994) 
http://www.wto.org/cngl ish/does __ e/lcgal_e/35-dag.pdf at 15 Novernher 2008. 
7:. Opened for ,ignaturc 13 April llJ9lJ, done at London (entered into force I July 
11)91) J 
n Kevin Gray, Night to F/1//d Prill('iJ1ies l'is 11 1·is lfo/cs Go1·crni11g /11rernatio1w/ 
'frwle (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 2003) n. 
ht1p://www cid.harvard.cdu/cidtrade/Papers/gray.pdf al 8 August 2008. 
7-1 Sophi~t Murphy, Food Aid f~111erge11cl' (2008) Institute for Agriculture and 
Trade Policy, http://www.iatp.org/iatp/commentaries.dm'1rcfl D:::: 10:1587 at 15 
November 2008. 
67 
modilication of the Co11ve11tion. concerning issues such as the dq,1rec or 
concessionality or food aid and targeting or food aid. he examined carefully 
from the per.spectivc or the right to rond. 
Thinking in the WTO 011 the question or rood aid is apparently 111ovi11g in 
the direction or an approach that would only permit an exception or carve-out 
for food aid in situation-.: of cmergcncy. 7" The que.stion is whether ,-.;uch an 
approach would be consistent with the responsibilities or states in respect of 
rood aid under the right to food. Would such a constraint i111pede the (klivcry 
of food aid lo prevent or forestall an emergency occurring. requiring that 
human disasters have already taken place in order l'or aid to he permissible'! 
From a hum,111-sccurity perspective. can emergencies he distinguished from 
situations in a number of developing countrie.s where the human security or 
people is threatened on ,l daily has is by lack or access to adequ,11e fuod•J In any 
e,1se. attention lo the impact 011 the right to rood of evolution of ruk·s on rood 
aid in the Food Aid Com·c111io11 and the WTO i.s clearly warr,mtcd lro111 a 
human-security perspective. 
4. CONCLUSION 
It is ol'te11 suggested that there is a profound normative temion between the 
regime of human rights on the one hand and that or the WTO 011 the othL'r. The 
authors or this chapter. holh intcrn,llional lawyers. each with a spccialisc1tio11 
in one of the two regimes. do not believe that the issue should he conceived a.-; 
one of co11l1icti11g legal right.-; and oh! igations. The problem stems largely frrn11 
the historical isolation or the institutional culture or the trade regime from that 
of' the hunwn rights regime. The challenge, both intellectual and praclic,11, is 
to end this isolation. such that the interpretation and evolution of the norms or 
the one regime arc conducted in a nwnncr that is consistent with the norms or 
the other. 
With this challenge also comes an exlr:tordinary opportunity to provide, in 
a post-Cold War context, an urientation for the international trade system that 
is based on widely agreed norms or human rights and humanity. In the absence 
of such an orientation. the future evolution of the trading system is likely to he 
hostage lo conllicting n,1tional and regional interests and pcrspccti\'cs. espe-
cially after the collapse of the Washington consensus, and the accompanying 
scepticism - including among leading economists themselves - about the abil-
ity of economics to provide a general rormula for development. 
7' WTO Commiltcc on A~riculturc. C 'hair\ /fr/£Trnu' Papcr: Fo/ld r\id ( WTO. 
Geneva, 10-11 April 2006), http://www.,,lu.org/cn.glish/trnlop_dagric_c/rclpapn~. 
apr06_c.ht111 at 8 August 2008. 
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In this chapter, the authors have chosen to focus on aspects of the ICESCR 
that clearly hear on human security and their interrelationship with WTO 
treaty norms, both in respect to the interpretation of existing rules and in the 
context of the continuing evolution of those rules. We believe that human 
security (here understood in terms of the protection of human life and health) 
as a fundamental value has already been recognized in various provisions of 
the WTO Agreements and in their interpretation by the Appellate Body. 
As international lawyers, we have sought to focus in particular on the 
compatibility of different treaty norms and regimes, based on the notion that 
the avoidance of conflict of norms and the imperative to give effectiveness to 
all international obligations arc fundamental principles of the international 
legal systern. This approach leads to the identification of a select number of 
very concrete issues that may be pursued by the UN human rights institutions 
with respect to the WTO system, going beyond open-ended debate and spec-
ulation about the overall relationship between human rights and globalisation. 
We believe that it is through consideration of specific relationships between 
treaty norms and their interpretation that concern for economic, social and 
cultural rights can most effectively penetrate the rather isolated institutional 
culture of the WTO. 
